Deceiving Two Masters: The Effects of Financial Incentives and Reputational Concerns on Reporting Bias by Ulrich Schaefer & Miro Feller
Deceiving Two Masters: The Effects of
Financial Incentives and Reputational Concerns
on Reporting Bias
January 27, 2019
Abstract. We study managers’ decisions to bias financial reports if these
reports are used by capital and labor markets to learn about firm value and
managerial talent. If managers have private information on their financial
and reputational incentives, we identify interactions in the capital and labor
markets’ use of reports: The reception of reports in one market motivates re-
porting bias, which reduces value relevance and price efficiency in the other
market. This interaction changes established results and has implications for
financial reporting standard setters: We characterize environments where cap-
ital market efficiency can be improved by eliminating information on man-
agerial talent from financial reports – even if this information is relevant for
investors. This is particularly the case if there is high uncertainty about man-
agers’ reputational concerns and if talent uncertainty represents a small part
of the overall fundamental uncertainty.
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I. Introduction
In past decades, several severe cases of earnings management have attracted public at-
tention. They usually were followed by debates on dysfunctional effects of equity-based
incentives: Rewarding managers for changes in stock price potentially motivates them
to misrepresent the economic situation of the firm, for instance by using their discretion
in biasing financial reports (e.g., Burns & Kedia, 2006; Crocker & Slemrod, 2007). The
public debate focuses on financial incentives. Yet, there are other reasons for managers to
misreport earnings. In a survey of 169 CFOs, Dichev et al. (2013) find that “80.4% be-
lieve that senior managers misrepresent earnings to avoid adverse career consequences”.
This should not be surprising as academic literature on incentive provision emphasizes
the role of reputation and career considerations in managerial decision making. Even in
the absence of explicit financial incentives, managers try and signal talent to create job
opportunities and influence future compensation (e.g., Fama, 1980; Holmstro¨m, 1982).
Preparers of financial reports arguably encounter both types of incentives when mak-
ing their reporting choices. We therefore consider the joint effect of financial incentives
and reputational concerns on a manager’s decision to bias statutory reports. Financial
reports convey information on both firm profitability and the talent of the management in
place. They serve the dual purpose of informing investors about firm value and providing
information about the management, which can be used by future employers. Thus, man-
agers are tempted to inflate financial reports (i) to mislead the capital market and increase
their variable compensation and (ii) to build up reputation in the labor market.
A key assumption in our study is that capital and labor markets face uncertainty about
managers financial and reputational incentives.1 Financial incentives may be unknown
because outsiders do not know the details of managers’ compensation arrangements and
private stock holdings (e.g., Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000). Benefits of managerial repu-
tation are potentially realized in the distant future. Thus, asymmetric information with
regard to reputational concerns may result from managers’ unknown career plans and
individual time preferences. If managers’ reporting objectives are uncertain, their bias
cannot be perfectly backed out from financial reports but is associated with noise.2
1Ferri et al. (2018) find that investors’ earnings response depends on the availability of public informa-
tion on managers’ compensation arrangements. This indicates that uncertainty about managers’ financial
incentives is relevant in real reporting environments. Moreover, price reactions to voluntary departures
indicate that markets are unable to anticipate managers’ career-related decisions. A recent example is the
8.4% stock price drop of Netflix, Inc. following the announcement that its CFO David Wells has decided to
step down, see Ramachandran & Trentmann (2018).
2Beyer et al. (2018) find strong evidence for the occurrence and impact of such reporting noise.
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Given this assumption, we find that financial incentives and reputational concerns
have interrelated effects. Capital and labor market efficiency are reduced if the financial
report is simultaneously used in both markets to learn about the firm value and managerial
talent. To provide intuition for this result, assume that the labor market uses the financial
report to update beliefs about managerial talent. This creates incentives for the manager to
overstate firm performance. Because financial investors are uncertain about the strength
of the manager’s reputational motives, they anticipate that the manager manipulates the
report, however they do not know how much bias is added. Thus, information on firm
value is diluted and investors curtail the usage of the report to update their beliefs. Fol-
lowing this logic, increasing usage of the financial report in the labor market reduces its
usefulness in the capital market and vice versa.
We show that the interactions of financial and reputational incentives challenge pre-
viously established results. Existing literature concludes that higher uncertainty about
fundamental information improves value relevance and price efficiency. It creates ad-
ditional demand for information and increases the value of financial reports in reducing
uncertainty (Holmstro¨m, 1982; Narayanan, 1985; Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000). In our set-
ting, managerial talent represents fundamental information in the labor market and in the
capital market as it affects firm value. One might therefore expect that higher talent uncer-
tainty improves capital and labor market efficiency. Yet, we identify cases where capital
market efficiency decreases in the uncertainty about talent: We show that higher talent
uncertainty generally amplifies earnings response in the labor market. This increases in-
centives to bias the report. The additional reporting noise potentially overcompensates
the increased demand for information in the capital market.
Our results have implications for the design of financial reporting standards. A promi-
nent objective of standard setters is to provide information that affects investors’ firm val-
uations. For instance, the IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting directs
firms to report information which is relevant to investors and creditors independent of
its relevance to other reporting users. This includes information on managerial contri-
bution to firm value (IASB, 2018, OB4 and OB10). We find ambiguous effects of such
regulation. Requiring firms to report on managerial talent increases the weight that labor
markets assign to reports and aggravates reporting noise. This may reduce value relevance
of financial reports in capital markets – even if talent information is relevant to investors.
We find that reporting on managerial contribution to firm value may reduce capital market
efficiency if (i) there is high uncertainty about managers’ reputational concerns and (ii)
talent uncertainty represents only a small part of the overall fundamental uncertainty.
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On a general level, our results indicate risks in mandating additional information in
financial reports, which are not only relevant for financial investors as primary users but
also for other stakeholders such as business partners, competitors, rating agencies and
the authorities. If such stakeholders increasingly use financial reports as an information
source, managers face complex incentives to dissemble, which aggravate the investors’
problem to understand and back out reporting bias. Initiatives to increase the informa-
tional content of financial reports might therefore backfire and undermine the credibility
of reports. This could be one explanation for the mixed empirical evidence of value
relevance studies: Although standard setters have extended and refined reporting require-
ments over the past decades, empirical studies hardly identify an increase of value rel-
evance of accounting information (Francis & Schipper, 1999; Barth et al. , 2001; Gu,
2007). Our results show similarities to existing work on relevance-reliability trade offs:
Requiring firms to report more extensive information on firm value may have undesirable
consequences if the corresponding standards offer managers additional discretion to bias
reports. In contrast to this literature, reporting bias in our setting does not result from
increased leeway in accounting but from additional reporting users, which are interested
in the supplemental information and add incentives to bias financial reports.
Our analysis contributes to three strands of literature. First, our results are related
to the literature on biased financial reporting. Previous work uses signal-jamming mod-
els to study how managers’ financial incentives and reputational concerns affect earnings
management and market efficiency. The seminal literature assumes that managerial in-
centives are common knowledge. Stein (1989) studies investment decisions of managers
who are interested in maximizing the short-term stock price. Managers choose subopti-
mal investment levels and inflate current earnings even though this behavior is rationally
anticipated by the market. Similar results are obtained if managers have reputational con-
cerns: Holmstro¨m (1982) shows that even in the absence of explicit financial incentives
managers exert productive effort to manage the labor market’s expectations of their un-
observable talent. While this outcome might be desirable if firms are unable to provide
contractual incentives, Narayanan (1985) illustrates detrimental consequences of reputa-
tional concerns. In all these models, earnings management is an equilibrium outcome, but
managers fail to deceive the markets. Their decisions are correctly anticipated and do not
affect the ability to learn about firm value and managerial talent.
Fischer & Verrecchia (2000) show that this result depends on the assumption that
managers’ reporting objectives are publicly known. If investors face uncertainty about a
manager’s equity-based incentives, reporting bias dilutes the informational content of the
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financial report and reduces the capital market’s ability to make inferences on firm value.3
In this case, higher uncertainty about the manager’s incentives reduces capital market
efficiency while higher uncertainty about firm fundamentals increases value relevance
and price efficiency.4 We use a similar model framework assuming that firm value partly
reflects managerial talent and managers face both financial incentives and reputational
concerns. While there is other work addressing the joint effects of financial incentives
and reputational concerns (e.g., Prendergast & Stole, 1996; Milbourn et al. , 2001), we
are the first to consider asymmetric information on both types of incentives. We identify
an interaction in the capital and labor market use of financial reports that challenges well-
known comparative statics results and allows for novel empirical predictions: Although
higher fundamental uncertainty creates additional demand for information, it may reduce
earnings response and price efficiency in the capital market.
Second, our study complements the existing literature on interactions of financial
incentives and reputational concerns. The career concerns literature studies optimal fi-
nancial incentives in the presence of reputational concerns.5 In his seminal work, Fama
(1980) emphasizes the role of labor markets in disciplining managerial behavior. He de-
lineates a dynamic model framework, in which incentives are provided implicitly by the
wage revision process in a competitive labor market. Fama (1980) argues that reputational
concerns play a natural role in motivating managers and may be a substitute for explicit
financial incentives. Subsequent studies substantiate these results (e.g., Holmstro¨m, 1982;
Gibbons & Murphy, 1992).6 For instance, Gibbons & Murphy (1992) show that in the
presence of implicit incentives, firms optimize total incentives: If reputational concerns
are strong, optimal contracts provide only weak financial incentives. In contrast to this
strand of literature, we view financial incentives and reputational concerns from a market
perspective rather than a firm perspective: We do not consider optimal contracts in the
3Related work uses the assumption of uncertain reporting objectives to study reversal effects of report-
ing bias (Sankar & Subramanyam, 2001), relevance-reliability trade-offs in accounting (Dye & Sridhar,
2004), the interplay of real and accounting earnings management (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005) and impli-
cations for firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions (Einhorn & Ziv, 2012; Heinle & Verrecchia, 2016).
4Uncertainty about managers’ reporting objectives does not necessarily result from unknown incentives.
For example, Dye & Sridhar (2004) consider unknown costs of misreporting and find similar results.
5Career concerns models typically employ a specific set of assumptions: Managers have unobservable
ability to increase firm value; all parties hold symmetric ex ante beliefs about managerial ability; future
compensation reflects the labor market’s beliefs about talent. Our model shares some of these features.
However, we do not explicate the formation of compensation contracts and do not require symmetric ex
ante information. We therefore refer more generally to reputational concerns instead of career concerns.
6Other literature deals with optimal job design (Kaarbøe & Olsen, 2006; Casas-Arce & Hejeebu, 2012),
the reporting environment (Autrey et al. , 2007) and performance measure aggregation (Autrey et al. , 2010;
Arya & Mittendorf, 2011).
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presence of implicit incentives, but study the joint effect of given financial incentives and
reputational concerns on market reactions and market efficiency.
Third, we contribute to the literature studying the effects of managers’ reputational
motives on capital market efficiency. Nagar (1999) addresses firms’ decisions on volun-
tary disclosure if managers maximize the market assessment of their talent. If there is
uncertainty about the publicly available information and the corresponding market valua-
tion, (risk-averse) managers might strategically withhold private information. In line with
our results, reputational concerns have detrimental effects on price efficiency. Beyer &
Dye (2012) consider managers’ decisions on disclosing (unfavorable) financial forecasts
when their information endowment is unknown. They find that even strategic managers
might disclose unfavorable information in early periods to increase the credibility of fu-
ture non-disclosure decisions. In contrast to our study, they do not address managers’
reputation to increase firm value, but their reputation to be forthcoming, i.e., to disclose
all available information. While we study a mandatory reporting setting, both Nagar
(1999) and Beyer & Dye (2012) consider decisions on (verifiable) voluntary disclosure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we explain our model and
characterize the reporting equilibrium. The benchmark analysis is presented in Section
III. Section IV provides our main results with regard to market efficiency and reporting
bias. In Section V, we discuss implications for reporting standard design. Section VI
considers two model extensions to illustrate the effects of correlated fundamentals and
multiple reporting users. In Section VII, we summarize the results and conclude.
II. Model setup
The manager of a publicly traded firm privately observes information about the firm value
and releases a (potentially biased) financial report. This report is used by the capital and
labor markets to update their beliefs about the firm fundamentals.7 Before receiving in-
formation, the manager shares the market participants’ ex ante beliefs about the structure
and distribution of firm value. We assume that firm value is the sum of two normally
distributed components:
v˜ = η˜ + ˜θ. (1)
7Real reporting environments are characterized by multiple stakeholders interested in various aspects
of firm value and thus providing incentives to manipulate the information content. In Section VI, we show
that our main results carry over to a setting with more than two reporting users.
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The component η˜ ∼ N(0, σ2η) represents all aspects of firm value which are not related to
the manager in place. It comprises the value created by all tangible and intangible assets
independent of managerial influence. We refer to this component as the asset value of
the firm. The component ˜θ ∼ N(0, σ2θ) is the managerial contribution to firm value and
epitomizes the talent of the manager in place.8 In our main analysis, we assume that
the asset value and managerial talent are stochastically independent, i.e., Cov[η˜, ˜θ] = 0.9
Thus, the firm value v˜ is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2v = σ2η + σ2θ .
The manager receives a private signal revealing both the asset value η and talent com-
ponent θ of firm value.10 For instance, this signal might represent internal information
provided by the firm’s accounting system which are not publicly observable.11 Subse-
quently, the manager must issue a public financial report on firm value. We assume that
she can engage in (accounting) earnings management, that is she can overstate or under-
state firm value in her report r by adding a positive or negative bias b = r−v. Misreporting
is accompanied by convex private costs:12
c(r) = 1
2
∙ (r − v)2 = 1
2
∙ b2. (2)
Such costs result from the time-consuming process of finding and using leeway in finan-
cial reporting standards as well as conflicts with auditors and potential legal liabilities if
earnings management is detected.
The capital and labor markets cannot observe any other information about the firm
value or its components, but form their beliefs based on the financial report. While there
8Expected asset value and talent do not affect our results qualitatively and are normalized to zero.
9This assumption excludes potential interactive effects of the asset value and managerial talent – a
typical simplification in the literature (e.g., Holmstro¨m, 1982; Gibbons & Murphy, 1992; Nagar, 1999).
However, we acknowledge that complementarities in firms’ production functions are likely to exist: More
profitable firms hire talented managers and, in turn, these managers increase the profitability of the available
resources (see Murphy & Za´bojnı´k, 2004; Gabaix & Landier, 2008; Tervio¨, 2008). In Section VI, we allow
for positive correlation of η˜ and ˜θ to study the additional effects of such complementarities.
10The results of our main analysis do not depend on whether the manager receives disaggregate informa-
tion on both components or only on aggregate firm value. It seems realistic to assume that an experienced
manager holds private information on her talent. Thus, an additional signal of aggregate firm value allows
her to make inferences on the realized asset value.
11We assume that the accounting signal perfectly reveals firm value. Allowing for noisy accounting
measurement does not affect our results qualitatively.
12Many earnings management studies advance the view that misreporting may be accompanied by con-
siderable costs for managers (e.g., Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000; Dye & Sridhar, 2004). This assumption
is reasonable in our setting of mandatory disclosure where the content of financial reports is regulated by
standard setters and firms are subject to legal enforcement. We therefore do not consider a cheap talk setting
(see Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Stocken, 2000; Bertomeu &Marinovic, 2016). For an overview of disclosure
models with both costless and costly signaling see Stocken (2013).
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may be alternative ways for managers to signal talent, financial reports are particularly
useful for this purpose. They reflect the manager’s performance in a real business en-
vironment. Furthermore, audited financial reports are arguably more credible than most
other information channels. We view capital and labor markets as symmetric and risk-
neutral institutions, which efficiently process the available information. They differ only
in the fundamental value evaluated. The capital market price P reflects all available infor-
mation on firm value v˜ = η˜ + ˜θ.13 The talent assessment T in the labor market represents
public information on the manager’s talent ˜θ as one component of firm value.14
P = E [v˜|r] and T = E[˜θ|r]. (3)
We assume that the manager’s utility U depends on both the market price P as well as the
assessment T of her talent. The marginal increase of her utility in the market outcomes is
given by the incentive weights xP and xT respectively:
U = xP ∙ P + xT ∙ T − c(r). (4)
We do not endogenize incentives but view xP and xT as summation of the manager’s given
explicit and implicit interest in the market outcomes.15 She privately knows the weights
xP and xT while the capital and labor markets are uncertain about their realizations.16
The incentive weight xP represents the manager’s aggregate financial incentives in
the firm’s market price. This includes incentives to increase the market price like equity-
13There is empirical evidence that capital market prices incorporate managerial contributions to firm
value. For instance, Johnson et al. (1985) and Jenter et al. (2016) document abnormal stock price reactions
in cases of sudden executive deaths. Nam et al. (2018) show that information on managerial decisions at
previous employers affects the current employer’s stock price.
14This assumption is typical for career concern models. In contrast, Murphy & Za´bojnı´k (2004), Murphy
& Za´bojnı´k (2007) and Eisfeldt & Kuhnen (2013) suggest that there are firm-specific and general talent
components where only the latter are transferable between firms. Our results hold qualitatively if we assume
that talent θ is the weighted sum of firm-specific and general talent.
15For an analysis of optimal incentives when managers provide productive effort and manipulate earn-
ings see Goldman & Slezak (2006), Dutta & Fan (2014) and Peng & Ro¨ell (2014).
16We follow existing work and use a static reduced-form model to study the effects of misreporting (e.g.,
Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000; Dye & Sridhar, 2004; Heinle & Verrecchia, 2016). The incentive weights xP
and xT render the net incentives to bias reports considering all future consequences of misreporting. We
do not explicitly model bias reversals under clean surplus accounting nor do we delineate a (dynamic)
contracting framework that implies the utility (4). In this regard, we deviate from career concerns models
and borrow from disclosure models, which do not provide microstructure of reporting incentives (e.g.,
Nagar, 1999). The assumption that managers maximize the market price of their talent is not farfetched
and could result from the fact that expected talent determines future wages (Holmstro¨m, 1982). Then, the
incentive weight xT could reflect the manager’s negotiation power (Meyer & Vickers, 1997) or be a “proxy
for the length of the agent’s career horizon” (Autrey et al. , 2010).
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based compensation, but also implicit incentives to decrease the price, for instance in the
case of share repurchases. The incentive weight xT reflects the manager’s reputational
incentives: By signaling talent to the labor market, the manager gains reputation. Such
reputation is typically related to job opportunities and higher future compensation levels
(e.g., Holmstro¨m, 1982). Managers differ in their exposure xT to the talent assessment.
For instance, prior studies argue that particularly young managers benefit from high talent
assessment and show strong reputational concerns (e.g., Prendergast & Stole, 1996). Fol-
lowing this argument, xT may reflect the manager’s age. Moreover, note that xT represents
the evaluation of future wages. There may be considerable differences in the individual
discounting of future compensation (see Holmstro¨m & Costa, 1986; Reichelstein, 1997).
This could be a result of the individuals’ time preferences or career planning. Managers
might face high private costs of changing affiliations or are reluctant to change jobs be-
cause of attractive internal career opportunities and retention incentives. For this type of
manager, talent assessment is less relevant. Negative values of xT are characteristic of
managers who fear the additional responsibility and higher expectations associated with
positive talent assessments.17
We assume that the capital and labor markets have common beliefs about the distribu-
tion of incentives, x˜P ∼ N(μP, σ2P) and x˜T ∼ N(μT , σ2T ) with μP, μT ≥ 0.18 It is reasonable
to assume that the manager’s incentives are not observable by the markets. This is obvious
in the case of financial incentives if compensation contracts, bonus arrangements or the
manager’s private stock holdings are not fully disclosed. While managerial age as one de-
terminant of reputational concerns is observable, there are other determinants, which can
hardly be assessed by the market. For example, firms use incentives to retain managers:
In many cases, managers suffer considerable losses in deferred compensation, pension
claims or other perks like specific loan conditions if they retire. Such contractual clauses
are not necessarily public and affect the power of managers’ reputational concerns. More-
over, potential benefits of reputation are realized somewhere in the future. Their impact
on managers’ decisions depends on career plans and individual preferences (for instance,
career horizons and time preferences), which are unobservable for firm outsiders.
17Note that our results do not hinge on the fact that xT may be negative. Our results hold even if the
probability of negative xT is arbitrarily small.
18We study a manager’s reputation to increase firm value if there is uncertainty about her talent. Instead,
we could assume that the manager has private information on her costs of misreporting (see Dye & Sridhar,
2004) and cares for her reputation to report truthfully. Both types of reputation imply similar results.
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We analyze perfect Bayesian equilibria of this reporting game characterized by
(i) the manager’s reporting strategy r(η, θ, xP, xT ), which maximizes her utility (4) for
given asset value and talent realizations η and θ as well as incentive weights xP and
xT and conjectures ˆP(r) and ˆT (r) about the markets’ reactions to her report,
(ii) the capital and labor market prices P(r) and T (r) as functions of the financial report
r according to (3) for given conjecture rˆ(η, θ, xP, xT ) about the manager’s strategy,
(iii) the condition that all conjectures are self-fulfilling, i.e., rˆ(∙) = r(∙), ˆP(∙) = P(∙) and
ˆT (∙) = T (∙).
As typical in the accounting literature, we restrict our analysis to linear equilibria, i.e.,
the manager’s reporting strategy r(∙) as well as the capital and labor market outcomes P(∙)
and T (∙) are linear functions of the available information.19,20 In line with previous work,
we use two measures of market efficiency to evaluate reporting equilibria (e.g., Fischer
& Verrecchia, 2000; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005; Heinle & Verrecchia, 2016). First, we
study the earnings response coefficients (ERCs)
βP ≡ dP/dr and βT ≡ dT/dr (5)
in the capital and labor markets. These measures reflect the sensitivity of the market
outcomes to the firm’s accounting information. They have been used in the theoretical
literature as proxies of value relevance. Second, we analyze the relative reduction of
uncertainty about fundamentals in the markets21
ΠP ≡ Var[v˜] − Var[v˜|P]Var[v˜] and ΠT ≡
Var[˜θ] − Var[˜θ|T ]
Var[˜θ] . (6)
The termsΠP andΠT measure the extent to which all public and private information about
fundamentals is incorporated into market prices. We follow the literature in interpreting
theses measures as proxies for price efficiency in the capital and labor markets.22
19The restriction to linear strategies allows us to focus on a single equilibrium. Einhorn & Ziv (2012)
show that this restriction is useful to rule out unreasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
20See Guttman et al. (2006) for a more general equilibrium analysis in a model with only financial
incentives. The study characterizes equilibria with partial pooling. Even if there is no uncertainty about
managers’ reporting objectives, investors are no longer able to back out reporting bias.
21Market efficiency has been extensively studied in capital market settings, but is typically not consid-
ered in labor market models. Studies of reputational concerns typically assume that there is no uncertainty
about the value of reputation for managers. In consequence, reporting bias is anticipated and can be backed
out from the report. In our setting of uncertain reputational incentives, labor market efficiency is a valid
question because bias is accompanied by reporting noise.
22Other measures of market efficiency comprise entropy measures (Huang, 2016; Jiang & Yang, 2017)
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Proposition 1 proves the existence and uniqueness of a linear equilibrium.23
Proposition 1 If the manager is motivated by financial incentives and reputational con-
cerns, there exists a unique linear equilibrium with the following properties:24
r = v + b = v + βP ∙ xP + βT ∙ xT , (7)
βP =
σ2v
σ2v + σ
2
P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T
and βT =
σ2θ
σ2v + σ
2
P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T
. (8)
The equilibrium strategies have a very intuitive interpretation. The manager chooses
the bias level considering both her financial and reputational motives. The equilibrium
bias level b trades off the marginal benefits and costs of dissembling. The former de-
pend on the markets’ responsiveness to the financial report: If it is easier to influence the
markets, (i.e., for higher levels of βP and βT ), the manager chooses a higher bias level.
The capital and labor markets’ equilibrium ERCs reflect the reported information on firm
value and talent respectively, βP = Cov[v˜, r˜] ∙ Var[r˜]−1 and βT = Cov[˜θ, r˜] ∙ Var[r˜]−1.
The equilibrium results are useful to determine the measures of market efficiency.
It turns out that value relevance and price efficiency are identical measures: The degree
to which rational markets rely on the financial report corresponds to its usefulness in
reducing uncertainty about fundamentals.25 Based on this observation, we focus on the
analysis of the market ERCs knowing that they represent both value relevance and price
efficiency.
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, the measures of price efficiency and value relevance coin-
cide, i.e., ΠP = βP and ΠT = βT .
or the (negative) expected squared difference between reported and true value (Fischer & Stocken, 2004).
In our model setting, all three alternative definitions coincide.
23Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium ERCs implicitly. We refrain from stating the explicit
solutions as they do not provide additional insights.
24All proofs are provided in the appendix.
25The congruence of value relevance and price efficiency does not necessarily hold in a multi-stage
reporting environment as considered by Caskey et al. (2010).
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III. Benchmark analysis
Previous literature focuses on settings, in which managers’ reports are either motivated
exclusively by financial incentives (xT = 0, i.e., μT = σ2T = 0) or by reputational motives
(xP = 0, i.e., μP = σ2P = 0). Lemma 1 summarizes comparative static results in these
special cases of our model.26
Lemma 1 Results with either financial incentives or reputational concerns
a) Consider the case that the manager only pursues financial objectives (xT = 0). Higher
uncertainty about the firm value (i.e., asset value η˜ or talent ˜θ) improves earnings
response βBP in the capital market.
b) If the manager is motivated by reputational objectives only (xP = 0), higher uncer-
tainty about her talent ˜θ improves earnings response in the labor market. In contrast,
higher uncertainty about the asset value η˜ reduces the labor market response βBT .
If the manager is not motivated by reputational concerns but seeks to maximize the
firm’s market price, higher uncertainty about asset value or managerial talent generally
improves capital market efficiency. As there is more demand for information, financial
reports become more valuable and are used increasingly by investors, i.e., the ERC in
the capital market increases (dβBP/dσ2k > 0 for k ∈ {η, θ}).27 These effects occur when-
ever investors use (biased) financial reports to learn about firm value (e.g., Holthausen &
Verrecchia, 1988; Stein, 1989; Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000).28
In the absence of financial incentives, the manager’s reputational concerns have sim-
ilar effects. Higher uncertainty about her talent makes financial reports more useful for
potential employers. Thus, the labor market ERC increases, dβBT/dσ2θ > 0. While tal-
ent θ is fundamental information for both markets, the asset value η represents noise for
the labor market. It dilutes the talent information without having any explanatory value.
In consequence, higher uncertainty about the asset value attenuates the labor market re-
sponse, dβBT/dσ2η < 0. These observations are in line with the results of the literature on
reputational concerns (Narayanan, 1985; Holmstro¨m, 1982; Gibbons & Murphy, 1992).
26Let βBP = βP|xT=0 and βBT = βT |xP=0 denote the capital and labor market ERCs in the benchmark cases.
27Note that in equilibrium improved capital market efficiency is associated with higher expected report-
ing bias, i.e., dE[˜b]/dσ2k > 0. This illustrates that measures of reporting bias are inappropriate to evaluate
the level of information asymmetry between management and the capital market: Reporting bias is ratio-
nally anticipated by the markets, which discount reports for expected bias levels (e.g., Narayanan, 1985;
Stein, 1989; Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000).
28Note that the uncertainty about the manager’s incentives is irrelevant for these results. The logic
applies even if her motives are publicly known.
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The generalization of Lemma 1 seems obvious. If fundamental information is asso-
ciated with higher uncertainty, there is a stronger response to the financial report in the
respective market. Although this motivates additional reporting bias, market efficiency
is effectively improved. Our main analysis shows that this logic no longer applies if the
manager faces both types of incentives.
IV. Main results
Equilibrium analysis
Corollary 2 summarizes characteristics of the reporting equilibrium.
Corollary 2 Characteristics of the equilibrium ERCs
a) The capital market response to the financial report is always stronger than the labor
market response, βT = σ2θ ∙ (σ2η + σ2θ)−1 ∙ βP.
b) The ERCs in the capital and labor market are positive and bounded from above, 0 <
βP < 1 and 0 < βT < σ2θ ∙ (σ2η + σ2θ)−1.
The capital market price is more sensitive to the manager’s report than the talent as-
sessment. This results from the nested structure of firm value and managerial talent. The
financial report is a noisy signal of firm value, which is the sum of asset value and talent.
In contrast to the capital market, the labor market is only interested in the talent compo-
nent: Potential employers perceive the information on the firm’s asset value as additional
noise because this information is unrelated to managerial talent. Hence, financial reports
show a higher correlation with the total firm value than with managerial talent as one of
its components (Cov[˜θ, r˜] < Cov[v˜, r˜]).
Note that in the presence of uncertain reporting objectives more reporting bias is
associated with additional noise. If earnings response increases, the markets rationally
anticipate that the manager adjusts her bias level. However, they do not know precisely
how much bias is added due to the uncertainty about the manager’s incentives x˜P and x˜T .
Formally, the uncertainty associated with the report increases in βP and βT :
Var[r˜] = Var[v˜] + Var[˜b] = σ2v + σ2P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T . (9)
This leads to our first main observation. With financial and reputational incentives, both
market reactions motivate bias and induce reporting noise. Note that the noise induced
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by one of the markets represents an information externality for the other market: If the
capital market’s reaction dilutes the content of the report, the labor market learns less
and reduces its response accordingly. Vice versa, the noise induced by the labor market
represents an externality for the capital market and is considered by the firm’s investors.
As a consequence, the equilibrium capital and labor market ERCs are reduced compared
to the benchmark cases with only one type of incentives.
Proposition 2 The capital and labor market ERCs are lower than in a reporting environ-
ment with only financial or reputational concerns, i.e., βP < βBP and βT < βBT .
Based on this result, we study comparative static results to gain further insights into
the interaction of financial incentives and reputational concerns. Lemma 2 summarizes
the effect of higher uncertainty about the manager’s financial and reputational motives.
Lemma 2 Both markets’ equilibrium ERCs as well as the expected equilibrium bias
are decreasing in uncertainty about the manager’s financial and reputational motives,
dβm/dσ2n < 0 and dE[˜b]/dσ2n < 0 for m, n ∈ {P,T }.
Higher uncertainty about the manager’s financial incentives or her reputational con-
cerns aggravates the noise in the report and attenuates the markets’ equilibrium reactions.
As a consequence, the manager faces lower-powered incentives to bias the report. This
result is standard in the literature (e.g., Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000) and also holds in our
model with financial and reputational incentives.29
Next, we study the effect of higher uncertainty about firm value on the equilibrium
results. The results in this case are less obvious and require a detailed analysis. The equi-
librium ERCs according to Proposition 1 formalize the interdependency between financial
incentives and reputational concerns: The ERC βP in the capital market is a function of
the model parameters as well as the ERC βT in the labor market and vice versa.
Corollary 3 Increasing uncertainty σ2η and σ2θ about the value components has a direct
as well as an indirect effect on each equilibrium ERC:
dβP
dσ2k
=
∂βP
∂σ2k︸︷︷︸
≡DP,k
+
dβP
dβT
∙ dβT
dσ2k︸      ︷︷      ︸
≡IP,k
,
dβT
dσ2k
=
∂βT
∂σ2k︸︷︷︸
≡DT,k
+
dβT
dβP
∙ dβP
dσ2k︸      ︷︷      ︸
≡IT,k
for k ∈ {η, θ}. (10)
Dm,k and Im,k measure the direct and indirect effects of increasing σ2k on βm, m ∈ {P,T }.
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Figure 1 Direct and indirect effects of higher uncertainty about firm value (k ∈ {η, θ})
Figure 1 illustrates the direct and indirect effects identified in Corollary 3. If the
uncertainty σ2k about the asset value (k = η) or managerial talent (k = θ) increases, this
has direct impact on both equilibrium ERCs according to (8). The direct effects reflect
the optimal earnings response in one market holding the other market’s response fixed.
The indirect effects are a consequence of the manager’s reaction to the direct effects.
Higher uncertainty about the firm value implies an adjustment of the markets’ ERCs βP
and βT . As illustrated in (9), the adjustment of the capital market ERC βP also affects the
reporting noise and thus creates an externality on the usefulness of the report in the labor
market. Vice versa, the direct effect on βT alters the investors’ ability to learn about firm
value. These externalities create the indirect effects formally defined in Corollary 3.
Following the argument above, the indirect effect Im,k of higher uncertainty about
the value component k ∈ {η, θ} on the ERC βm aggregates two effects formally given
by the derivatives dβm/dβn and dβn/dσ2k . First, the other market’s ERC βn influences
the reporting noise and thereby the equilibrium level of βm.30 Second, the other market
adjusts its reaction to higher uncertainty about the value component. If managers are
motivated exclusively by financial incentives (xT = 0), the ERC in the capital market fully
reflects the direct effects, i.e., IP,η = IP,θ = 0. Analogously, if managers are motivated by
reputational concerns only (xP = 0), the reaction of the labor market is independent of the
capital market response, i.e., IT,η = IT,θ = 0.
29Although not explicitly stated, this result also prevails in the benchmark cases of section III.
30This requires that the incentive weight related to the outcome of the other market is uncertain, σ2n > 0.
It is obvious from (8) that dβm/dβn ≤ 0. Equality only holds for σ2n = 0.
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The effect of higher uncertainty about the asset value
This section provides a detailed analysis of the direct and indirect effects of increasing
uncertainty about the asset value. Lemma 3 establishes the signs of these effects.
Lemma 3 Direct and indirect effects of higher uncertainty about the asset value
a) Higher uncertainty about the asset value σ2η has a positive direct effect on earnings
response in the capital market (DP,η > 0), but a negative direct effect on the labor
market reaction (DT,η < 0).
b) The indirect effects that are associated with an increase of the uncertainty about the
firm’s asset value σ2η amplify the direct effects, i.e., IP,η > 0 and IT,η < 0.
The asset value η˜ represents fundamental information for investors, but noise in the
labor market. Thus, higher uncertainty about this component provokes a positive direct
effect in the capital market: There is more to learn for investors who show greater respon-
siveness to the report, i.e., DP,η > 0. At the same time, information about the manager’s
talent is diluted and the labor market’s reaction to the report is attenuated, i.e., DT,η < 0.
The indirect effects of σ2η amplify the direct effects. Increases in σ2η attenuate the
labor market’s earnings response and thus reduce the manager’s incentives to dissemble.
The noise in the financial report is reduced, which, in turn, enhances its usefulness for
the financial investors, IP,η > 0. Moreover, the positive direct effect in the capital market
motivates additional bias. According to (9), this dilutes information about managerial
talent and makes the report less useful for the labor market, IT,η < 0. The total effects are
unambiguous because direct and indirect effects are equally directed.
Proposition 3 If the uncertainty σ2η about the asset value increases, the capital market’s
earnings response βP increases while the labor market’s earnings response βT decreases.
Our results confirm the expectations raised in the benchmark analysis. The asset value
η is relevant information in the capital market. Hence, higher uncertainty σ2η makes the
financial report more valuable for investors of the firm. The corresponding ERC increases,
dβP/dσ2η > 0. At the same time, η is unrelated to the manager’s influence on firm value
and dilutes the talent information in the report. The labor market therefore reduces its
ERC in response to higher uncertainty about the asset value, dβT/dσ2η < 0. As the direct
and indirect effects have the same sign, there is no ambiguity in the market reactions.
Figure 2 illustrates our results. The three graphs depict the equilibrium ERCs for dif-
ferent degrees of uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns,σ2T ∈ {1.6, 16, 49}.
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Figure 2 Effects of higher uncertainty about the asset value on market efficiency
(μ2P = μ2T = 40, σ2θ = 1.1, σ2P = 1)
As shown in Lemma 2, both earnings reactions are unambiguously decreasing in the vari-
ance σ2T : The markets learn less about firm fundamentals if there is more uncertainty
about the manager’s motives. As a consequence, the manager’s incentives to dissemble
are attenuated. Confirming Proposition 3, the capital market ERC βP is increasing and the
labor market ERC βT is decreasing in higher uncertainty about the asset value.
The effect of higher uncertainty about talent value
In this section, we turn to the effects of higher uncertainty about the managerial talent.
Lemma 4 characterizes the direct and indirect effects of talent uncertainty.
Lemma 4 Direct and indirect effects of higher talent uncertainty
a) Higher uncertainty σ2θ about managerial talent implies a positive direct effect on both
market reactions, i.e., DP,θ, DT,θ > 0.
b) The sign of the indirect effect of higher talent uncertainty σ2θ on the capital market
response is negative (IP,θ < 0). The indirect effect IT,θ on the labor market response is
ambiguous.
In contrast to the asset value, managerial talent θ represents fundamental information
for capital and labor markets: The labor market is inherently interested in the manager’s
talent; financial investors learn about its contribution to firm value. Thus, increasing the
uncertainty about talent makes the financial report more valuable for both reporting users.
This is reflected in positive direct effects, DP,θ, DT,θ > 0.
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Interestingly, the indirect effects of higher talent uncertainty can be opposed to the
direct effects. The positive direct effects on both markets’ ERCs provide additional incen-
tives for the manager to bias the report and thus introduce additional noise as illustrated
in equation (9). This creates a counterforce to the direct effects. The indirect effects sub-
sume these countervailing effects: While the indirect effect on the capital market response
is generally opposed to the direct effect (IP,θ < 0), the sign of the indirect effect IT,θ on the
labor market ERC is ambiguous. It can amplify or counteract the direct effect.
The reason for the asymmetry in the results is the nested structure of the fundamental
information in the market objectives. Financial investors assign a market price based on
both asset value and managerial talent; the labor market assesses only talent as a subset
of these components. In line with Corollary 2 a), this implies that the equilibrium ERC
in the labor market is always lower than the equilibrium ERC in the capital market. At
the same time, βT is more sensitive to changes in the variance σ2θ .31 To formalize this
argument consider the indirect effects according to Corollary 3. IP,θ and IT,θ reflect the
total variations dβT/dσ2θ and dβP/dσ2θ of the equilibrium ERCs. It is easy to see that
the marginal increase of the labor market ERC in talent uncertainty generally exceeds
the increase of the capital market ERC, dβT/dσ2θ > dβP/dσ2θ . While the former is always
positive, the latter can take negative values. As a consequence, the capital market response
is strictly attenuated while the indirect effect on the labor market response is ambiguous.
Proposition 4 summarizes the total effects of higher talent uncertainty.
Proposition 4 The labor market’s earnings response βT increases in the uncertainty
about the manager’s talent σ2θ . The effect of talent uncertainty on the capital market’s
earnings response βP is ambiguous.
Managerial talent θ represents fundamental information in both markets. Follow-
ing the arguments of the benchmark analysis, higher talent uncertainty should therefore
increase the demand for information and enhance the usefulness of the report for both
reporting users. Proposition 4 only partly confirms this intuition. Indeed, the labor mar-
ket’s earnings response increases in talent uncertainty. However, higher uncertainty about
the manager’s contribution to firm value can reduce earnings response in the capital mar-
ket. The reason for this observation is the interdependency between the markets’ ERCs
resulting from the manager’s incentives to dissemble. Proposition 5 provides a detailed
analysis of the ambiguous effects of talent uncertainty on the capital market ERC.
31This is apparent from the implicit characterization in (8).
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Proposition 5 The ambiguous effects of talent uncertainty on the capital market ERC
a) If the uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns is sufficiently high com-
pared to the uncertainty about her financial incentives (σ2T > 3 ∙ σ2P), the capital
market’s earnings response is decreasing in intermediate values of talent uncertainty
σ2θ ∈ [σ2θ , σ2θ] and increasing elsewhere.
b) The range [σ2
θ
, σ2θ] is widened as the uncertainty about the manager’s financial motives
decreases or the uncertainty about her reputational concerns increases. It is bounded
by the uncertainty about the asset value, [σ2
θ
, σ2θ] ⊂ [0, 2 ∙ σ2η].
Whether the capital market ERC is decreasing in the variance of talent depends on
the relative uncertainty about the manager’s financial and reputational motives. These
results reflect our previous observations. As the uncertainty about financial incentives
decreases, the externality of the financial investors’ reaction on the labor market ERC βT
is attenuated. Thus, the labor market response provides high-powered incentives to bias
the financial report. This again introduces noise into the report, especially if there is high
uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns. The report becomes less useful
for investors. As a consequence, low values of σ2P and high values of σ2T characterize
settings, in which the capital market ERC is decreasing in talent uncertainty.
Our results are illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts the equilibrium ERCs as func-
tions of talent uncertainty σ2θ . The three differently shaded graphs visualize the effects of
higher uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns (σ2T ∈ {1.6, 16, 49}). Con-
firming Lemma 2, increases in σ2T reduce both ERCs. As shown before, the uncertainty
about the manager’s reputational concerns does not only affect the level of the ERCs, but
also their slope. For low uncertainty about reputational motives (σ2T = 1.6), the capital
market earnings response βP is generally increasing in talent uncertainty. For σ2T = 16,
the capital market ERC is decreasing within the range σ2θ ∈ [0.03, 1.38]. If the uncertainty
about the managers reputational concerns increases to σ2T = 49, this range is widened to
[0.01, 1.53]. In line with Proposition 4, βT is increasing in talent uncertainty.
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Figure 3 Effects of higher talent uncertainty on market efficiency
(μ2P = μ2T = 40, σ2η = 0.8, σ2P = 1)
Expected reporting bias
We use our results to highlight implications for the expected bias level,
E[˜b] = E[b(η˜, ˜θ, x˜P, x˜T )] = βP ∙ μP + βT ∙ μT . (11)
The derivative of the expected bias is thus given by
dE[˜b]
dσ2k
= μP ∙ dβPdσ2k
+ μT ∙ dβTdσ2k
for k ∈ {η, θ}. (12)
We can therefore use the comparative static results of the previous sections to analyze
the effect of asset value and talent uncertainty on the expected bias level. We know from
Proposition 3 that the capital market ERC is increasing and the labor market ERC is
decreasing in the uncertainty about the asset value. Thus, it is unclear which of the two
effects dominates. Corollary 4 clarifies how the statistical properties of the manager’s
reputational incentives affect the slope of the expected bias level.
Corollary 4 The expected reporting bias is decreasing in the uncertainty about the firm’s
asset value if
(i) the average benefits related to reputation are sufficiently high, i.e., μT > μT ,
(ii) markets have sufficient information about the reputational motives, i.e., σ2T < σ2T .
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These results are intuitive. If the expected marginal benefits μT of increasing talent
assessment are sufficiently high, it is likely that the manager chooses her report primarily
to influence the labor market. The labor market’s ERC is decreasing in the uncertainty
about the asset value. Therefore, the expected bias is decreasing in σ2η if μT is high.
To understand the second part of the proposition, consider the case that the uncertainty
σ2T about the manager’s reputational concerns is high. Hence, any increase in the labor
market’s earnings response βT is associated with significant incremental reporting noise.
The labor market earnings response is therefore compressed: It takes low values and
is hardly sensitive to changes in σ2η. As a consequence, the adjustment of the capital
market ERC is leading the manager’s bias choice. Higher uncertainty about the asset value
implies higher expected reporting bias. Vice versa, the labor market’s earnings response
can only be dominant if there is low uncertainty about the manager’s reputational motives.
The results of the previous section show that more uncertainty about talent σ2θ gener-
ally implies higher responsiveness in the labor market, but may reduce earnings response
in the capital market, i.e., dβP/dσ2θ < 0 and dβT/dσ2θ > 0. According to (12), this implies
countervailing effects on the manager’s bias choice: She increases the bias in response
to the labor market reaction, but reduces it considering the attenuated reaction by finan-
cial investors. The total effect is ambiguous. Corollary 5 characterizes conditions for the
expected reporting bias to decrease in talent uncertainty.
Corollary 5 For σ2T > 3 ∙ σ2P and σ2θ ∈ [σ2θ , σ2θ], the expected bias level is decreasing in
the uncertainty about talent if and only if
(i) the average benefits related to reputation are low on average, i.e., μT < μT ,
(ii) markets are sufficiently uncertain about the reputational motives, i.e., σ2T > σ2T .
According to Proposition 5, the capital market ERC decreases in talent uncertainty
if the markets are sufficiently uncertain about the manager’s reputational concerns (σ2T >
3∙σ2P). In this case, the expected bias level is decreasing in talent uncertainty σ2θ ∈ [σ2θ , σ2θ]
if (i) the average benefits of reputation are low or (ii) markets have little information on the
manager’s reputational concerns. Low values of μT ensure that the manager primarily re-
acts to the capital market ERC βP, which is decreasing in σ2θ . Moreover, high uncertainty
about reputational concerns σ2T attenuates the labor market reaction. Thus, the manager’s
biasing decision is primarily led by the capital market response.
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Figure 4 Effects of higher uncertainty about firm value on the expected reporting bias
(μ2P = μ2T = 40, σ2P = 1, σ2θ = 1.1, σ2η = 0.8)
Note that the effects of higher uncertainty about the asset value and managerial talent
stand in stark contrast. Increasing variance σ2η reduces the expected bias if the manager’s
bias choice is led by the labor market reaction (i.e., for high μT and low σ2T ); increasing
variance σ2θ reduces the expected bias if the manager’s decision is primarily motivated by
the capital market (i.e., for low μT and high σ2T ).
To illustrate the results, we use the numerical examples introduced in the previous
sections. The left-hand and right-hand sides of Figure 4 depict the expected reporting
bias as a function of σ2η and σ2θ respectively. E[˜b] is decreasing in σ2η for low uncertainty
about the manager’s reputational concerns (σ2T = 1.6) and increasing for high uncertainty
σ2T ∈ {16, 49}. In contrast, low uncertainty about reputational concerns (σ2T ∈ {1.6, 16})
ensures that the expected reporting bias is increasing in σ2θ . If the uncertainty about the
reputational motives is sufficiently high (σ2T = 49), the expected bias is decreasing within
the range σ2θ ∈ [0.06, 0.55]. Note that the expected bias even falls below its level without
any talent uncertainty. Talent uncertainty and the corresponding reputational incentives
can reduce reporting bias compared to a situation with observable managerial talent.
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V. Should firms report on managers’ contributions to
firm value? A standard setter’s perspective
A prominent objective of financial reporting standards is the provision of decision-useful
information for investors of the firm (Barth et al. , 2001).32 For instance, the IASB Con-
ceptual Framework for Financial Reporting states that reports should “provide financial
information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors,
lenders and other creditors in making decisions” (IASB, 2018, OB10). A central criterion
for information included in reports is relevance in the sense of IASB (2018, QC6): It
should be capable of changing users’ decisions to buy, sell or hold equity and debt instru-
ments. These objectives are closely related to the concepts of value relevance and price
efficiency as formally defined in our model. Information is useful if it has high impact on
the capital market price and reduces the investors’ uncertainty about the firm value.
Information on the abilities of the firm’s management seem to be material in many
cases (see Johnson et al. , 1985; Jenter et al. , 2016). Accordingly, the IASB classifies such
information as relevant and mandates the disclosure of information “about how efficiently
and effectively the reporting entity’s management has discharged its responsibilities to
use the entity’s economic resources” (IASB, 2018, OB4). Moreover, the value-relevance
criterion must be applied independent of the usefulness of the information for other stake-
holders. The IASB acknowledges that there are other users of financial reports. However,
reports are not primarily directed to these parties (IASB, 2018, OB10). This suggests
that the reporting content should be tailored to the informational needs of investors and
creditors and neglect the presence of other reporting users such as labor markets.
Such treatment disregards the interactions between reporting users identified in our
study. Including information that is relevant for the managerial labor market motivates
additional earnings management, which in turn dilutes information about the firm value.
This can cause a reduction of value relevance and price efficiency in the capital market. To
formalize our argument, consider a modified model setting, in which financial reporting
standard setters require the management only to report on asset value η and to exclude any
information about the talent component θ. While financial investors are still interested in
the firm value v = η + θ, the modified reporting objective alters the manager’s costs of
misreporting. In contrast to equation (2), the manager faces potential litigation costs if
32Aside from the provision of decision-useful information, financial reporting standard setters pursue
other objectives such as stewardship (e.g., Holthausen & Watts, 2001). Due to the limited focus of our
model, we can only address standard setters’ intentions to provide value-relevant information.
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her report does not correctly reflect the firm’s asset value:33
c(r) = 1
2
∙ (r − η)2. (13)
The modified reporting objective has considerable implications for the equilibrium results
summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 5 If the manager is supposed to report exclusively on the firm’s asset value, we
have the following unique linear equilibrium:34
r† = η + β†P ∙ xP, β†P =
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
P ∙ β†2P
and β†T = 0. (14)
If managerial talent is not part of the reporting objective, the equilibrium financial
report excludes any talent information. As a consequence, the report is irrelevant for
the labor market and not used to update the a priori beliefs about talent, β†T = 0. The
interdependency between the capital market and labor market ERCs is dissolved.
A comparison of value relevance β†P and price efficiency Π
†
P in the capital market with
the results of our main model highlights two differences. First, the financial report does
not reflect managerial talent. Note that talent represents fundamental information for in-
vestors. In line with the IASB’s argumentation, eliminating talent information therefore
reduces the usefulness of the report in the capital market. However, there is a coun-
tervailing effect. In the absence of the labor market’s earnings response, the manager’s
incentives to misreport are attenuated. Therefore, the noise associated with the manager’s
bias choice is reduced. The latter effect allows better inferences on the firm’s asset value
and improves the usefulness of the report for financial investors. Proposition 6 identifies
conditions under which the elimination of talent information improves value relevance
and price efficiency in the capital market.35
33In this case, it is important that the manager has disaggregate information about the asset value and
her talent. This could be because she receives a report on firm value v by the firm’s internal accounting
system and has private information about her talent θ. We come to similar conclusions if the manager does
not precisely know the value of her talent but observes a noisy signal of the talent realization.
34We use (∙)† to denote the equilibrium coefficients under the modified reporting objective.
35In contrast to our main analysis, value relevance β†P and price efficiency Π
†
P are no longer identical if
talent information is removed from reports. This is why Proposition 6 addresses both measures separately.
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Proposition 6 Eliminating the talent information from reporting objectives improves
(i) value relevance (i.e., β†P > βP) if the uncertainty about the manager’s reputational
concerns is sufficiently high compared to her financial incentives (σ2T > 4 ∙σ2P) and if
talent uncertainty takes intermediate values σ2θ ∈ [σ2L, σ2H].
(ii) price efficiency (i.e., Π†P > ΠP) if the uncertainty about the manager’s reputational
concerns σ2T is sufficiently high and if talent uncertainty takes intermediate values
σ2θ ∈ [σ2l , σ2h] ⊂ [σ2L, σ2H].
The proposition highlights that it may be beneficial for value relevance and price
efficiency to remove information about managerial talent from financial reports. This is
the case if there is high uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns. Then, the
incentives provided by the labor market induce significant reporting noise. Regulations
that restrict the reporting content or leave firms discretion about the reported information
can help to alleviate this problem by making reports less useful for the labor market.
This stands in contrast to the IASB’s conceptual framework, which generally mandates to
include (relevant) information on managerial contribution to firm value.
Moreover, the IASB conceptual reporting framework assesses the information needs
of reporting users aside from investors and creditors as largely irrelevant for the design
of financial reports. Our results indicate that the presence of other users, such as labor
markets, can critically influence the adequate choice of reporting standards. This is even
the case if standard setters focus exclusively on capital market efficiency. If users provide
incentives for managers to dissemble, this may cause additional reporting noise. As a
consequence, the usefulness of the report in the capital market may be reduced. Standard
setters should carefully consider potential detrimental effects of mandating the disclosure
of information which might be relevant for other reporting users.
VI. Extensions
Correlation of fundamentals
Empirical studies suggest a complementary relationship between the firm’s asset value
and managerial talent: Profitable firms with a large asset base are able to attract and retain
talented managers. To capture such relationship, the analysis in this section allows for
positive correlation ρ ∈ [0, 1] of asset value η˜ and managerial talent ˜θ.36 We find that
36If both components are perfectly correlated, learning about talent means learning about firm value.
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there is still a unique linear equilibrium characterized by the following market ERCs:
βP =
σ2v
σ2v + σ
2
P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T
, βT =
σ2θ + ρ ∙ ση ∙ σθ
σ2v + σ
2
P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T
. (15)
Note that the correlation does structurally not affect the capital market ERC according
to Proposition 1, but changes the form of the labor market ERC. To study the effect of
increasing ρ on capital market efficiency, we distinguish direct and indirect effects:37
dβP
dρ =
∂βP
∂ρ︸︷︷︸
≡DP,ρ
+
dβP
dβT
∙ dβTdρ︸      ︷︷      ︸
≡IP,ρ
. (16)
The direct effect DP,ρ represents the change of βP implied by a marginal increase of ρ if
the labor market does not adjust its earnings response βT . We find that DP,ρ is strictly
positive. The correlation ρ affects earnings response βP only via the variance σ2v = σ2η +
σ2θ +2 ∙ρ ∙ση ∙σθ. A higher variance σ2v raises financial investors’ demand for information
and implies higher earnings response, i.e., dβP/dρ > 0.
The indirect effect IP,ρ measures the adjustment of βP that is mediated by the labor
market earnings reaction βT (ρ). We find that this effect can be either positive or negative.
Although the direct effect is strictly positive, the total effect of increasing correlation
dβP/dρ = DP,ρ+ IP,ρ can be negative. Proposition 7 characterizes conditions which ensure
that earnings response in the capital market is decreasing in correlation.
Proposition 7 The effects of correlated fundamentals
a) If the uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns is sufficiently high com-
pared to the uncertainty about her financial incentives (σ2T > 12 ∙ σ2P) and talent
uncertainty is relatively small (σ2η > 5 ∙ σ2θ), the capital market’s earnings response is
decreasing within a non-empty interval of correlation levels [ρ, ρ] ⊂ [0, 1].
b) As uncertainty σ2T about reputational concerns increases, the interval [ρ, ρ] ap-
proaches the full range of positive correlation, limσ2T→∞ ρ = 0 and limσ2T→∞ ρ = 1.
To provide intuition for these results, it is useful to consider the equilibrium labor
market response. According to equation (15), higher correlation ρ has two countervailing
effects on the equilibrium level of βT . First, it makes the report more informative for the
labor market, which is apparent from the numerator Cov[˜θ, r˜] = σ2θ + ρ ∙ ση ∙ σθ. The
financial report is a noisy signal about firm value and comprises both asset value and
37We focus on the analysis of capital market efficiency.
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talent. If these components are correlated, the asset value is not perceived as pure noise
but conveys information about managerial talent. Second, higher correlation increases
the variance of the firm value σ2v and therefore the uncertainty associated with the report,
Var[r˜] = σ2v + σ2P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T . The report becomes less useful for the labor market.
It depends on the reporting environment whether the first or the second effect dom-
inates. If talent uncertainty is comparably high, increasing correlation does not have a
significant effect on the labor market’s ability to learn about talent. Correlation primar-
ily increases the uncertainty associated with the report. In this case, the denominator
increases at a faster rate than the numerator. If however talent uncertainty is sufficiently
low, the labor market hardly uses the report. In this case, even a small increase in correla-
tion improves the labor market’s learning about talent significantly.
Proposition 7 characterizes the latter case: If the labor market ERC βT increases
in correlation ρ, this provides additional incentives to bias the financial report. As a
consequence, the financial report is a noisier signal of firm value. This is particularly
the case if there is high uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns σ2T . For
σ2η > 5 ∙σ2θ and σ2T > 12 ∙σ2P, this effect is strong enough to make the capital market reduce
its weight on the financial report within a range of correlation levels [ρ, ρ]. This interval
is widened and finally approaches the full range of positive correlation if the uncertainty
about the manager’s reputational concerns is sufficiently high.
Multiple users of financial reports
The previous analysis can be extended to more than two users of financial reports. In this
section, we use a generalized model to study how the number of the reporting users and
their objectives affect capital market efficiency. In contrast to our main analysis, assume
that the manager issues her report to the capital market (a = 0) and n additional risk-
neutral users (a = 1, ..., n). Addressee a ∈ A ≡ {0, ..., n} is interested in a specific subset
of assets of the firm, which contribute to firm value. For any subgroup of reporting users
M ∈ P(A), let v˜M denote the component of the firm value which constitutes fundamental
information for all users a ∈ M while it is irrelevant to any user a ∈ A/M.38 This defines
a disaggregation of firm value into disjoint components, v˜ ≡ ∑M∈P(A) v˜M. As in our main
analysis, we assume that each value component is normally distributed, v˜M ∼ N(0, σ2M).
38P(∙) denotes the power set of a given set, i.e., it is the set of all subsets.
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Components are mutually independent.39 We denote σ2v =
∑
M∈P(A) σ2M.
Moreover, define S a ≡ {M ∈ P(A)| a ∈ M} the subgroups of reporting users which
contain user a ∈ A and v˜a ≡ ∑M∈S a v˜M his aggregate objective. It is reasonable to assume
that the capital market is interested in all aspects of firm value, i.e., v˜0 = v˜. After observing
the financial report, each user a ∈ A defines a price Pa reflecting the publicly available
information about his objective, Pa = E[v˜a|r]. The manager chooses her reporting bias b
anticipating all users’ reactions. She is interested in the outcomes of all reporting users:
U =
∑
a∈A
xa ∙ Pa − 12 ∙ b
2. (17)
The manager privately learns the realizations of the incentive weights xa. All reporting
users hold identical beliefs about their prior distribution: (x˜a)a∈A follow a multivariate nor-
mal distribution and are mutually independent with x˜a ∼ N(μa, σ2a). We define efficiency
measures analogously to our main analysis: The ERC βa measures how closely the price
Pa is linked to the financial report, βa ≡ dPa/dr.
Lemma 6 There exists a unique linear equilibrium characterized by
b =
∑
a∈A
βa ∙ xa and βa =
∑
M∈S a
σ2M
σ2v + β
2
a ∙
∑
s∈A
γ(sa)2 ∙ σ2s
(18)
where γ(sa) = Var[v˜s]/Var[v˜a] measures the relative uncertainty associated with the ob-
jectives of the reporting users s and a.
Note that the relative size of the equilibrium ERCs represents the relative uncertainty
about the users’ objectives, i.e., βs = γ(sa) ∙βa. To highlight implications for capital market
efficiency, we focus on the financial investors’ ERC β0.
Corollary 6 The capital market ERC β0 is decreasing if
a) a reporting user a = n + 1 is added who is interested in part of the firm value, i.e.,
|S n+1| > 0, and provides (uncertain) incentives to bias the report, i.e., σ2n+1 > 0.
b) user a ∈ A/{0} is interested in a different objective with higher relative uncertainty.
39Our main analysis constitutes a special case of this general setup. The asset value represents funda-
mental information only for financial investors while managerial talent is fundamental in both markets, i.e.,
v˜ = v˜{P} + v˜{P,T } with independent components v˜{P} = η˜ and v˜{P,T } = ˜θ.
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We can conclude that increasing the number of reporting users or the uncertainty
about the users’ objectives generally reduces capital market efficiency. As illustrated in
our main analysis, the effect of higher uncertainty about firm value on the capital market
ERCs depends on the origin of this uncertainty. For M ∈ P(A), let
AM ≡
{
a ∈ M ∣∣∣ γ(a0) < 2/3} (19)
denote the set of reporting users who are interested in v˜M and whose objective is associated
with relatively low uncertainty. More precisely, the definition requires that the uncertainty
about the objective of a user is smaller than two thirds of the aggregate uncertainty about
firm value. This helps us to characterize settings where higher uncertainty about firm
value reduces capital market efficiency.
Proposition 8 For M ∈ P(A), the capital market ERC β0 is decreasing in uncertainty
about the value component v˜M if AM is non-empty and the following condition holds:
∑
a∈AM
(−wa) ∙ σ2a >
∑
a∈A/AM
wa ∙ σ2a where wa ≡
 (3 ∙ γ(a0) − 2) ∙ γ(a0) for a ∈ M3 ∙ γ(a0)2 for a < M . (20)
Proposition 8 naturally generalizes the results of our main analysis. Capital market
efficiency might decrease in the uncertainty about fundamental information v˜M. This is the
case if other reporting users exist who strive to learn about v˜M and whose objectives are
associated with relatively low uncertainty, i.e., γ(a0) = Var[v˜a]/σ2v < 2/3.40 This condition
ensures that, first, increasing the variance σ2M does not only raise the information demand
of financial investors but also of other users and, second, that σ2M has a stronger effect on
these users’ ERCs than on the capital market ERC. Third, condition (20) requires that the
aggregate uncertainty (σ2a)a∈AM associated with the incentives provided by the competing
reporting users must be sufficiently high. Under these three conditions the indirect effects
of increasing the uncertainty σ2M dominate the direct effect. Although financial investors
have higher demand for information, the additional reporting bias induced by other re-
porting users significantly dilutes information on firm value. As a consequence, capital
market efficiency is reduced.
40This observation is in line with the results of Proposition 5. The capital market ERC can only decrease
in σ2θ as far as σ2θ < 2 ∙ σ2η, which is equivalent to σ2θ/σ2v < 2/3.
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VII. Conclusion
We study managers’ reporting bias in the presence of financial incentives and reputa-
tional concerns. Our analysis identifies interactions of both types of incentives assuming
that capital and labor markets are uncertain about managers’ reporting objectives: The
use of the financial report in one market motivates noisy bias and reduces the value of
the report in the other market. As a consequence, the presence of both financial incen-
tives and reputational concerns reduces financial and labor market efficiency compared to
settings where managers encounter only one type of incentives. Furthermore, our results
highlight the subtle role of fundamental uncertainty in real reporting environments with
multiple reporting users. When financial reports are processed by a single user, increasing
fundamental uncertainty creates additional demand for information and improves value
relevance and price efficiency (e.g., Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000). Our results show that
this conclusion may not be valid if multiple stakeholders have a joint interest in a sub-
group of the firm’s assets and use financial reports to learn about these assets. In this case,
increasing fundamental uncertainty has countervailing effects. First, each reporting user
assigns higher weight to the report, reacting to the additional demand for information.
Second, the additional attention provides incentives to bias the report, which increases
reporting noise. Considering managers’ financial and reputational incentives, we find that
higher uncertainty about managerial talent generally improves labor market efficiency, but
may decrease value relevance and price efficiency in the capital market. This is particu-
larly the case if markets are sufficiently uncertain about managers’ reputational motives
and if talent uncertainty is low compared to the overall fundamental uncertainty.
Our results have implications for standard setters’ intentions to provide relevant infor-
mation to investors and creditors. We characterize settings in which the value relevance of
financial reports can be improved by eliminating talent information – even if this informa-
tion is relevant to financial investors. What seems to be a contradiction can be explained
by the reporting noise associated with managers’ reputational concerns: Making reports
less meaningful for labor markets mitigates incentives to dissemble and may therefore
enhance investors’ insights into firm fundamentals. A practical example is the standard
setters’ choice between different measurement concepts for assets. For instance, standard
setters might require recording certain groups of assets at their value in use, which is
typically calculated as net present value of future cash flows generated in combination
with the firm’s given assets.41 Arguably, talented managers employ available assets in a
41IAS 36 requires firms to potentially report assets’ value in use when conducting impairment tests.
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more efficient way, which results in higher value in use. The value in use measurement is
therefore informative about managerial talent. In contrast, fair value measurement does
conceptually not convey information about the influence of the firm’s management: Fair
values represent (market) prices which do not reflect potential complementarities with the
firm’s other assets.
On a more general level, our results show that capital market efficiency is not nec-
essarily improved if standard setters implement recognition and measurement rules that
provide a more accurate depiction of firm value. In this regard, our results show simi-
larities to existing work on relevance-reliability trade offs: A more precise depiction of
firm value in financial reports may be undesirable if the corresponding standards offer
managers additional discretion to bias reports. In line with this observation, we show that
more precise measures of firm value may increase reporting bias. However, reporting bias
in our setting does not result from increased leeway in accounting but from additional re-
porting users, which are interested in the supplemental information and add incentives to
bias financial reports.
Following this logic, our analysis indicates risks of extending statutory reporting re-
quirements. In an attempt to increase transparency and to provide a complete picture of
firm assets, standard setters such as the IASB mandate the disclosure of information that
affects investors’ and creditors’ decisions. However, if additional information is useful
for various stakeholders, a more complete depiction of firm value may create complex re-
porting incentives, which aggravate the investors’ problem to understand and back out re-
porting bias. This may be one reason for the mixed empirical evidence of value-relevance
studies: Although reporting requirements have been extended and refined over the past
decades, there is little evidence of improved value relevance of financial reports in capital
markets (e.g., Francis & Schipper, 1999; Barth et al. , 2001; Gu, 2007). Existing litera-
ture discusses potential reasons such as the increasing relevance of intangible assets. This
analysis shows that additional reporting noise might have contributed to this development:
Financial reports have become a comprehensive instrument for managers to communicate
with the firms’ stakeholders. This creates implicit incentives to bias reports. Recent em-
pirical findings confirm the practical importance of reporting noise (Beyer et al. , 2018;
Ferri et al. , 2018). Our results could thus be an interesting starting point for empirical
work to study interactions in the capital and labor markets’ use of financial reports.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We restrict our analysis to linear equilibria, i.e., the manager’s biasing strategy as well as
the market outcomes are linear functions of the available information:
b(v, xP, xT ) = λ + λη ∙ η + λθ ∙ θ + λP ∙ xP + λT ∙ xT , (21)
P(r) = αP + βP ∙ r, T (r) = αT + βT ∙ r. (22)
Given the linear strategies, the manager’s objective (4) becomes
U = xP ∙ (αˆP + ˆβP ∙ r) + xT ∙ (αˆT + ˆβT ∙ r) − 12 ∙ (r − v)
2. (23)
The optimal bias level is given by:
r = v + ˆβP ∙ xP + ˆβT ∙ xT . (24)
A comparison with (21) shows
λ = 0, λη = λθ = 1, λP = ˆβP and λT = ˆβT . (25)
Given linear beliefs about the manager’s reporting strategy, the market outcomes (3) to
the report are given by:
P =
ˆλη ∙ σ2η + ˆλθ ∙ σ2θ
ˆλ2η ∙ σ2η + ˆλ2θ ∙ σ2θ + ˆλ2P ∙ σ2P + ˆλ2T ∙ σ2T
∙ (r − (ˆλ + ˆλP ∙ μP + ˆλT ∙ μT )), (26)
T =
ˆλθ ∙ σ2θ
ˆλ2η ∙ σ2η + ˆλ2θ ∙ σ2θ + ˆλ2P ∙ σ2P + ˆλ2T ∙ σ2T
∙ (r − (ˆλ + ˆλP ∙ μP + ˆλT ∙ μT )). (27)
Comparing the equilibrium market strategies with (22) yields:
αP = −(ˆλ + ˆλP ∙ μP + ˆλT ∙ μT ) ∙ βP, αT = −(ˆλ + ˆλP ∙ μP + ˆλT ∙ μT ) ∙ βT , (28)
βP =
ˆλη ∙ σ2η + ˆλθ ∙ σ2θ
ˆλ2η ∙ σ2η + ˆλ2θ ∙ σ2θ + ˆλ2P ∙ σ2P + ˆλ2T ∙ σ2T
, βT =
ˆλθ ∙ σ2θ
ˆλ2η ∙ σ2η + ˆλ2θ ∙ σ2θ + ˆλ2P ∙ σ2P + ˆλ2T ∙ σ2T
.(29)
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In equilibrium, the conjectures must be self-fulfilling. Substituting (25) into the above
coefficients yields:
αP = −(μP ∙ βP + μT ∙ βT ) ∙ βP, αT = −(μP ∙ βP + μT ∙ βT ) ∙ βT , (30)
βP =
σ2v
σ2v + σ
2
P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T
and βT =
σ2θ
σ2v + σ
2
P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T
. (31)
The equilibrium conditions obviously imply
βT =
Cov[˜θ, r˜]
Cov[v˜, r˜] ∙ βP =
σ2θ
σ2v
∙ βP. (32)
Thus, there is a one-to-one mapping between the capital market equilibrium ERC βP and
all other equilibrium coefficients. To show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium,
it is sufficient to prove that there is a unique value of βP solving
βP =
σ2v
σ2v + σ
2
P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T
. (33)
Substitution of (32) and rearranging terms yields(
σ2P +
σ4θ
σ4v
∙ σ2T
)
∙ β3P + σ2v ∙ (βP − 1) = 0. (34)
Note that the left-hand side of (34) is strictly increasing in βP. It becomes strictly negative
for βP = 0 and strictly positive for βP = 1. Continuity of the equilibrium condition
guarantees that (34) has a unique solution βP ∈ (0, 1). 
Proof of Corollary 1
Consider the measures of price efficiency defined in (6). Assuming linear strategies ac-
cording to (21) and (22), these measures have the following form.
ΠP =
Cov[v˜, ˜P]2
Var[v˜] ∙ Var[ ˜P] =
(λη ∙ σ2η + λθ ∙ σ2θ)2
σ2v ∙ (λ2η ∙ σ2η + λ2θ ∙ σ2θ + λ2P ∙ σ2P + λ2T ∙ σ2T )
, (35)
ΠT =
Cov[˜θ, ˜T ]2
Var[˜θ] ∙ Var[ ˜T ] =
λ2θ ∙ σ2θ
λ2η ∙ σ2η + λ2θ ∙ σ2θ + λ2P ∙ σ2P + λ2T ∙ σ2T
. (36)
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Substituting the equilibrium strategies according to Proposition 1 yields
ΠP = βP and ΠT =
σ2θ
σ2v + λ
2
P ∙ σ2P + λ2T ∙ σ2T
= βT . (37)

Proof of Lemma 1
The benchmark cases with either financial incentives or reputational concerns are special
cases of the general model for μP = σ2P = 0 and μT = σ2T = 0. The proof of Lemma 1
follows from our general analysis. 
Proof of Corollary 2
The relationship between βP and βT in a) has already been established in (32). Fur-
thermore, the proof of Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium capital market ERC is
bounded, 0 < βP < 1. Using the result in a), βT is strictly positive and bounded by σ
2
θ
σ2v
. 
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof follows directly from Lemma 2. The equilibrium ERCs are independent of μP
and μT but strictly decreasing in σ2P and σ2T . As the benchmark ERCs βBP and βBT reflect
the special cases for σ2T = 0 and σ2P = 0 respectively, the ERCs βP and βT in the general
model must take lower values, i.e., βBP > βP and βBT > βT . 
Proof of Lemma 2
We use the implicit function theorem to show comparative static results with regard to σ2k ,
k ∈ {P,T }. Using the result of Corollary 2 a), the equilibrium conditions for βP and βT
according to Proposition 1 can be stated in the following form:
FP(σ2k , βP(σ2k)) ≡
(
σ2P +
σ4θ
σ4v
∙ σ2T
)
∙ β3P + σ2v ∙ (βP − 1) = 0, (38)
FT (σ2k , βT (σ2k)) ≡
(
σ4v
σ4θ
∙ σ2P + σ2T
)
∙ β3T + σ2v ∙ βT − σ2θ = 0. (39)
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This reformulation of the equilibrium conditions dissolves the interdependency between
the equilibrium ERCs: FP characterizes βP without referring to βT ; analogously, FT de-
fines βT without referring to the capital market ERC. We obtain
dβP
dσ2P
= −∂FP/∂σ
2
P
∂FP/∂βP
= − β
3
P
3 ∙
(
σ2P +
σ4θ
σ4v
∙ σ2T
)
∙ β2P + σ2v
< 0, (40)
dβP
dσ2T
= −∂FP/∂σ
2
T
∂FP/∂βP
= −σ
4
θ
σ4v
∙ β
3
P
3 ∙
(
σ2P +
σ4θ
σ4v
∙ σ2T
)
∙ β2P + σ2v
< 0, (41)
dβT
dσ2P
= −∂FT/∂σ
2
P
∂FT/∂βT
= −σ
4
v
σ4θ
∙ β
3
T
3 ∙
(
σ4v
σ4θ
∙ σ2P + σ2T
)
∙ β2T + σ2v
< 0, (42)
dβT
dσ2T
= −∂FT/∂σ
2
T
∂FT/∂βT
= − β
3
T
3 ∙
(
σ4v
σ4θ
∙ σ2P + σ2T
)
∙ β2T + σ2v
< 0. (43)

Proof of Corollary 3
Based on the implicit equilibrium conditions according to Proposition 1, we interpret the
equilibrium ERC in one of the markets as a function of the model parameters and of the
ERC in the other market, i.e., βP = βP(σ2k , βT (σ2k)) and βT = βT (σ2k , βP(σ2k)) with k ∈ {η, θ}.
Thus, varying the parameter value σ2k has a direct effect on each of the equilibrium ERCs
as well as an indirect effect:
dβm
dσ2k
=
∂βm
∂σ2k︸︷︷︸
:=Dm,k
+
dβm
dβn
∙ dβn
dσ2k︸      ︷︷      ︸
:=Im,k
for m, n ∈ {P,T },m , n. (44)
The direct effect reflects the change in the ERC if the other market does not adjust its
earnings response. The indirect effect represents the change in the ERC as a result of the
other market’s adjustment. 
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Proof of Lemma 3 and 4
Rearranging the equilibrium conditions (8) according to Proposition 1 yields:
GP(σ2k , βP(σ2k , βT ), βT ) ≡ σ2P ∙ β3P + (σ2v + σ2T ∙ β2T ) ∙ βP − σ2v = 0, (45)
GT (σ2k , βP, βT (σ2k , βP)) ≡ σ2T ∙ β3T + (σ2v + σ2P ∙ β2P) ∙ βT − σ2θ = 0. (46)
The direct effect of σ2k on the capital market ERC βP reflects the change in the capital
market ERC holding the labor market response βT constant (k ∈ {η, θ}). To analyze the
sign of DP,k, we therefore neglect the adjustment of βT in response to a change in σ2k:
DP,η =
∂βP
∂σ2η
= −∂GP/∂σ
2
η
∂GP/∂βP
=
1 − βP
σ2v + 3 ∙ σ2P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T
> 0, (47)
DP,θ =
∂βP
∂σ2θ
= −∂GP/∂σ
2
θ
∂GP/∂βP
=
1 − βP
σ2v + 3 ∙ σ2P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T
> 0. (48)
According to Corollary 2, βP is smaller than 1. As a consequence, the direct effects have
positive sign. Analogously, we evaluate the direct effects of σ2k on the labor market ERC
assuming that βP is constant:
DT,η =
∂βT
∂σ2η
= −∂GT/∂σ
2
η
∂GT/∂βT
= − βT
σ2v + σ
2
P ∙ β2P + 3 ∙ σ2T ∙ β2T
< 0, (49)
DT,θ =
∂βT
∂σ2θ
= −∂GT/∂σ
2
θ
∂GT/∂βT
=
1 − βT
σ2v + σ
2
P ∙ β2P + 3 ∙ σ2T ∙ β2T
> 0. (50)
The signs of the direct effects follow from Corollary 2. To identify the signs of the indirect
effects, notice that
∂βP
∂βT
= −∂GP/∂βT
∂GP/∂βP
= − 2 ∙ σ
2
T ∙ βP ∙ βT
σ2v + 3 ∙ σ2P ∙ β2P + σ2T ∙ β2T
< 0, (51)
∂βT
∂βP
= −∂GT/∂βP
∂GT/∂βT
= − 2 ∙ σ
2
P ∙ βP ∙ βT
σ2v + σ
2
P ∙ β2P + 3 ∙ σ2T ∙ β2T
< 0. (52)
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Moreover, we use the modified equilibrium conditions (38) and (39) to obtain the total
effects of higher uncertainty on the equilibrium ERCs.
dβP
dσ2η
= −∂FP/∂σ
2
η
∂FP/∂βP
=
2 ∙ σ4θ ∙ σ2T ∙ β3P + σ6v ∙ (1 − βP)(
3 ∙
(
σ2P +
σ4θ
σ4v
∙ σ2T
)
∙ β2P + σ2v
)
∙ σ6v
> 0, (53)
dβP
dσ2θ
= −∂FP/∂σ
2
θ
∂FP/∂βP
= −2 ∙ σ
2
θ ∙ σ2η ∙ σ2T ∙ β3P − σ6v ∙ (1 − βP)(
3 ∙
(
σ2P +
σ4θ
σ4v
∙ σ2T
)
∙ β2P + σ2v
)
∙ σ6v
, (54)
dβT
dσ2η
= −∂FT/∂σ
2
η
∂FT/∂βT
= − 2 ∙ σ
2
v ∙ σ2P ∙ β3T + σ4θ ∙ βT(
3 ∙
(
σ4v
σ4θ
∙ σ2P + σ2T
)
∙ β2T + σ2v
)
∙ σ4θ
< 0, (55)
dβT
dσ2θ
= −∂FT/∂σ
2
θ
∂FT/∂βT
=
2 ∙ σ2v ∙ σ2η ∙ σ2P ∙ β3T + σ6θ ∙ (1 − βT )(
3 ∙
(
σ4v
σ4θ
∙ σ2P + σ2T
)
∙ β2T + σ2v
)
∙ σ6θ
> 0. (56)
This implies the following results:
IP,η =
∂βP
∂βT
∙ dβTdσ2η
> 0, IP,θ =
∂βP
∂βT
∙ dβT
dσ2θ
< 0 and IT,η =
∂βT
∂βP
∙ dβPdσ2η
< 0. (57)
Furthermore, we can conclude that
sgn(IT,θ) = (−1) ∙ sgn(dβP/dσ2θ). (58)
This sign depends on the model parameters as the numerical examples in section IV il-
lustrate. Moreover, we use the characteristics of βP and βT established in Corollary 2 to
show that dβT/dσ2θ > dβP/dσ2θ . According to (54) and (56) we find
dβT
dσ2θ
=
2 ∙ σ2v ∙ σ2η ∙ σ2P ∙ β3T + σ6θ ∙ (1 − βT )(
3 ∙
(
σ4v
σ4θ
∙ σ2P + σ2T
)
∙ β2T + σ2v
)
∙ σ6θ
>
σ6θ ∙ (1 − βP)(
3 ∙
(
σ4v
σ4θ
∙ σ2P + σ2T
)
∙ β2T + σ2v
)
∙ σ6θ
=
σ6v ∙ (1 − βP)(
3 ∙
(
σ2P +
σ4θ
σ4v
∙ σ2T
)
∙ β2P + σ2v
)
∙ σ6v
> −2 ∙ σ
2
θ ∙ σ2η ∙ σ2T ∙ β3P − σ6v ∙ (1 − βP)(
3 ∙
(
σ2P +
σ4θ
σ4v
∙ σ2T
)
∙ β2P + σ2v
)
∙ σ6v
=
dβP
dσ2θ
.
(59)
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Proof of Proposition 3 and 4
The effect of higher uncertainty about asset value and managerial talent on βP and βT has
already been established in the proof of Lemma 3 and 4. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Rearranging the equilibrium condition (38) yields:
σ2v ∙ (1 − βP) =
(
σ2P +
σ4θ
σ4v
∙ σ2T
)
∙ β3P. (60)
When substituting this expression into (54), we have
dβP
dσ2θ
≤ 0 ⇔ σ2
θ
≤ σ2θ ≤ σ2θ . (61)
The threshold levels σ2
θ
and σ2θ are given by
σ2
θ
≡
σ2T − σ2P −
√
(σ2T − 3 ∙ σ2P) ∙ σ2T
σ2P + σ
2
T
∙ σ2η, σ2θ ≡
σ2T − σ2P +
√
(σ2T − 3 ∙ σ2P) ∙ σ2T
σ2P + σ
2
T
∙ σ2η.(62)
The range [σ2
θ
, σ2θ] of opposed market reactions only exists if σ2T − 3 ∙σ2P > 0. It is easy to
see that under this condition the lower bound σ2
θ
is strictly positive. Moreover, increasing
the uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns widens this range while higher
uncertainty about financial incentives narrows it:
dσ2
θ
dσ2P
= −
2 − 5∙σ2T−3∙σ2P
2∙
√
(σ2T−3∙σ2P)∙σ2T
(σ2P + σ2T )2
∙ σ2η ∙ σ2T > 0,
dσ2
θ
dσ2T
=
2 − 5∙σ2T−3∙σ2P
2∙
√
(σ2T−3∙σ2P)∙σ2T
(σ2P + σ2T )2
∙ σ2η ∙ σ2P < 0, (63)
dσ2θ
dσ2P
= −
2 + 5∙σ
2
T−3∙σ2P
2∙
√
(σ2T−3∙σ2P)∙σ2T
(σ2P + σ2T )2
∙ σ2η ∙ σ2T < 0,
dσ2θ
dσ2T
=
2 + 5∙σ
2
T−3∙σ2P
2∙
√
(σ2T−3∙σ2P)∙σ2T
(σ2P + σ2T )2
∙ σ2η ∙ σ2P > 0. (64)
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The signs of these expressions follow from the fact that σ2T − 3 ∙ σ2P > 0 and thus
2 − 5 ∙ σ
2
T − 3 ∙ σ2P
2 ∙
√
(σ2T − 3 ∙ σ2P) ∙ σ2T
< 0. (65)
It is easy to see that
lim
σ2T→∞
σ2
θ
= 0 and lim
σ2T→∞
σ2θ = 2 ∙ σ2η. (66)

Proof of Corollary 4
We have established in Proposition 3 that dβP/dσ2η > 0 and dβT/dσ2η < 0. Note that βP
and βT do not depend on the average incentive weights μP and μT . It is therefore obvious
that the derivative dE[˜b]/dσ2η according to equation (12) is negative for sufficiently high
values of μT that exceed a threshold value μT .
To show the second part of the proposition, we rearrange the equilibrium conditions
(38) and (39) in the following way:
β3P =
σ6v ∙ (1 − βP)
σ4v ∙ σ2P + σ4θ ∙ σ2T
, β3T =
σ4θ ∙ (σ2θ − σ2v ∙ βT )
σ4v ∙ σ2P + σ4θ ∙ σ2T
. (67)
Substituting these identities into (53) and (55) yields:
dβP
dσ2η
=
(σ2η + σ2θ)2 ∙ σ2P + 3 ∙ σ4θ ∙ σ2T
((σ2η + σ2θ)2 ∙ σ2P + σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ (σ2η + σ2θ)
∙ (1 − βP) ∙ βP3 − 2 ∙ βP , (68)
dβT
dσ2η
= −2 ∙ (σ
2
η + σ
2
θ) ∙ σ2θ ∙ σ2P − ((σ2η + σ2θ)2 ∙ σ2P − σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ βT
((σ2η + σ2θ)2 ∙ σ2P + σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ (3 ∙ σ2θ − 2 ∙ (σ2η + σ2θ) ∙ βT )
∙ βT . (69)
Moreover, we use Corollary 2 a) to obtain the following equation:
dβT
dσ2η
= − σ
2
θ
σ2η + σ
2
θ
∙ 2 ∙ σ
4
v ∙ σ2P − (σ4v ∙ σ2P − σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ βP
(σ4v ∙ σ2P + 3 ∙ σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ (1 − βP)
∙ dβPdσ2η
. (70)
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Thus, we have the following derivative of the expected bias with regard to σ2η:
dE[˜b]
dσ2η
=
dβP
dσ2η
∙ μP + dβTdσ2η
∙ μT
=
1 − μT
μP
∙ σ
2
θ
σ2η + σ
2
θ
∙ 2 ∙ σ
4
v ∙ σ2P − (σ4v ∙ σ2P − σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ βP
(σ4v ∙ σ2P + 3 ∙ σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ (1 − βP)
 ∙ dβPdσ2η ∙ μP.
(71)
Proposition 3 establishes dβP/dσ2η > 0. Therefore, higher uncertainty about the asset
value reduces the expected reporting bias if and only if
μT
μP
∙ σ
2
θ
σ2η + σ
2
θ
∙ 2 ∙ σ
4
v ∙ σ2P − (σ4v ∙ σ2P − σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ βP
(σ4v ∙ σ2P + 3 ∙ σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ (1 − βP)
> 1. (72)
To simplify this condition, we must distinguish two cases.
Case a: (μT ∙ σ2θ − μP ∙ σ2v) ∙ σ4v ∙ σ2P − (3 ∙ μP ∙ σ2v + μT ∙ σ2θ) ∙ σ4θ ∙ σ2T > 0
Solving condition (72) for βP yields
βP < 1 +
μT ∙ σ2θ ∙ (σ4v ∙ σ2P + σ4θ ∙ σ2T )
(μT ∙ σ2θ − μP ∙ σ2v) ∙ σ4v ∙ σ2P − (3 ∙ μP ∙ σ2v + μT ∙ σ2θ) ∙ σ4θ ∙ σ2T
, (73)
which is generally true because βP < 1 according to Corollary 2. Thus, in this case, the
expected bias level is generally decreasing in the uncertainty about the asset value.
Case b: (μT ∙ σ2θ − μP ∙ σ2v) ∙ σ4v ∙ σ2P − (3 ∙ μP ∙ σ2v + μT ∙ σ2θ) ∙ σ4θ ∙ σ2T < 0
The condition that characterizes Case b can be rearranged to
σ2T >
(μT ∙ σ2θ − μP ∙ (σ2η + σ2θ)) ∙ (σ2η + σ2θ)2 ∙ σ2P
(μP ∙ 3 ∙ (σ2η + σ2θ) + μT ∙ σ2θ) ∙ σ4θ
. (74)
Thus, Case b applies for sufficiently high values of σ2T . The condition (72) can now be
rearranged as follows
βP > 1 −
μT ∙ σ2θ ∙ (σ4v ∙ σ2P + σ4θ ∙ σ2T )
(μP ∙ σ2v − μT ∙ σ2θ) ∙ σ4v ∙ σ2P + (3 ∙ μP ∙ σ2v + μT ∙ σ2θ) ∙ σ4θ ∙ σ2T︸                                                                           ︷︷                                                                           ︸
≡Hη
. (75)
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It is easy to establish that
dHη
dσ2T
= − 2 ∙ μT ∙ (μP ∙ σ
2
v + μT ∙ σ2θ) ∙ σ6θ ∙ σ4v ∙ σ2P
((μP ∙ σ2v − μT ∙ σ2θ) ∙ σ4v ∙ σ2P + (3 ∙ μP ∙ σ2v + μT ∙ σ2θ) ∙ σ4θ ∙ σ2T )2
< 0. (76)
Thus, the right-hand side of (75) is strictly increasing in σ2T . The left-hand side of (75) is
strictly decreasing as shown in Lemma 2. As a consequence, condition (75) is fulfilled for
a larger set of parameters if σ2T decreases. Moreover, it is easy to see that limσ2T→∞ βP = 0
while limσ2T→∞(1 − Hη) > 0. This proves the existence of σ
2
T ≥ 0 such that the expected
reporting bias is decreasing in σ2η for σ2T < σ
2
T . 
Proof of Corollary 5
According to equation (12) the slope of the expected reporting bias in talent uncertainty
depends on the derivatives of both markets’ ERCs. A negative slope of E[˜b] therefore
requires that dβP/dσ2θ or dβT/dσ2θ have negative sign. According to Proposition 4 we
have dβT/dσ2θ > 0. Any decrease of the expected reporting bias in talent uncertainty
therefore arises from a declining ERC in the capital market. We can therefore restrict our
analysis to the case dβP/dσ2θ < 0. According to Proposition 5, we have
dβP
dσ2θ
< 0 ⇔
(
σ2T − 3 ∙ σ2P > 0 ∧ σ2θ ∈ [σ2θ , σ2θ]
)
. (77)
If this condition holds, the derivative dE[˜b]/dσ2θ according to equation (12) is negative
for sufficiently low values of μT that fall below a threshold value μT . This proves the first
part of the proposition.
As shown in Proposition 5, the condition (77) holds for a wider range of parameters
if σ2T increases. Substituting (67) into (54) and (56) yields:
dβP
dσ2θ
=
σ4v ∙ σ2P − (2 ∙ σ2η − σ2θ) ∙ σ2θ ∙ σ2T
(σ4v ∙ σ2P + σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ σ2v
∙ (1 − βP) ∙ βP3 − 2 ∙ βP , (78)
dβT
dσ2θ
=
(3 ∙ σ2η + σ2θ) ∙ σ2v ∙ σ2P + σ4θ ∙ σ2T − ((2 ∙ σ2η + σ2θ) ∙ σ4v ∙ σ2P + σ6θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ βTσ2θ
(σ4v ∙ σ2P + σ4θ ∙ σ2T ) ∙ (3 ∙ σ2θ − 2 ∙ σ2v ∙ βT )
∙ βT . (79)
Thus, dβP/dσ2θ < 0 requires that
σ4v ∙ σ2P − (2 ∙ σ2η − σ2θ) ∙ σ2θ ∙ σ2T < 0. (80)
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Using Corollary 2, we can relate the derivatives dβP/dσ2θ and dβT/dσ2θ:
dβT
dσ2θ
=
σ2η ∙ βP
σ4v ∙ (3 − 2 ∙ βP)
−
(2 ∙ σ2η + σ2θ) ∙ σ2v ∙ σ2P + σ
6
θ
σ2v
∙ σ2T
(2 ∙ σ2η − σ2θ) ∙ σ2θ ∙ σ2T − σ4v ∙ σ2P
∙ dβP
dσ2θ
. (81)
Using this result, we obtain
dE[˜b]
dσ2θ
= μP ∙ dβPdσ2θ
+ μT ∙ dβTdσ2θ
=
μT ∙ σ2η ∙ βP
σ4v ∙ (3 − 2 ∙ βP)
+
μP − μT ∙ (2 ∙ σ
2
η + σ
2
θ) ∙ σ2v ∙ σ2P + σ
6
θ
σ2v
∙ σ2T
(2 ∙ σ2η − σ2θ) ∙ σ2θ ∙ σ2T − σ4v ∙ σ2P
 ∙ dβPdσ2θ .
(82)
Substituting dβP/dσ2θ yields
dE[˜b]
dσ2θ
< 0
⇔ βP < 1 −
μT ∙ σ
2
η
σ2v
∙ (σ4v ∙ σ2P + σ4θ ∙ σ2T )
μP ∙ ((2 ∙ σ2η − σ2θ) ∙ σ2θ ∙ σ2T − σ4v ∙ σ2P) − μT ∙ ((2 ∙ σ2η + σ2θ) ∙ σ2v ∙ σ2P + σ
6
θ
σ2v
∙ σ2T )︸                                                                                                    ︷︷                                                                                                    ︸
=Hθ
.
(83)
It is easy to verify that dHθ/dσ2T < 0. At the same time βP is strictly decreasing in σ2T (see
Lemma 2). Thus, the expected reporting bias is decreasing for a larger set of parameters
if σ2T increases or μT decreases. 
Proof of Lemma 5
Following the procedure of Proposition 1 with the modified cost function (2), we establish
the equilibrium conditions stated in the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 6
A comparison of the capital market ERCs according to Proposition 1 and Lemma 5 shows
that the ERC with modified reporting objective corresponds to the ERC in our main model
when there is no uncertainty about managerial talent, i.e., β†P = βP|σ2θ=0. It is therefore
sufficient to study under which conditions the capital market ERC βP in our main model
falls below its level without talent uncertainty, βP < βP|σ2θ=0.
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For this purpose, it is useful to refer to the explicit solution of βP. Applying Cardano’s
formula to the polynomial equation (38) yields the following unique real root:
βP =
3√A ∙
 3
√
1
2
+
√
1
4
+
1
27
∙ A + 3
√
1
2
−
√
1
4
+
1
27
∙ A
 (84)
with A = (σ
2
η+σ
2
θ )3
(σ2η+σ2θ )2∙σ2P+σ4θ ∙σ2T
. It is easy to see, that βP is increasing in A. We therefore have
βP < βP|σ2θ=0 ⇔ A < A|σ2θ=0 ⇔ σ2L ≤ σ2θ ≤ σ2H (85)
with σ2L ≡
σ2T−2∙σ2P+
√
(σ2T−4∙σ2P)∙σ2T
σ2P
∙ σ2η2 and σ2H ≡
σ2T−2∙σ2P−
√
(σ2T−4∙σ2P)∙σ2T
σ2P
∙ σ2η2 . This proves the
first part of the proposition. With the modified reporting objective, value relevance β†P and
price efficiency Π†P are not identical:
Π
†
P =
Cov[v˜, ˜P†]2
Var[v˜] ∙ Var[ ˜P†] =
σ2η
σ2v
∙ β†P. (86)
For the second part of the proposition, we must study the following condition:
ΠP < Π
†
P ⇔ βP <
σ2η
σ2v
∙ β†P. (87)
As σ2η/σ2v ≤ 1, this condition cannot be satisfied for σ2θ ≤ σ2L or σ2θ ≥ σ2H. Proposition 5
shows that βP has a local minimum in σ2θ ∈ [σ2L, σ2H]. The corresponding value of A is
A|σ2θ=σ2θ =
(σ2η + σ2θ)3
2 ∙ σ2θ ∙ σ2T ∙ σ2η
. (88)
We have already established that limσ2T→∞ σ
2
θ = 2 ∙ σ2η and thus limσ2T→∞ A|σ2θ=σ2η = 0. As
a consequence, we have
lim
σ2T→∞
βP = lim
A→0
βP = 0. (89)
On the other hand,
lim
σ2T→∞
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
θ
∙ β†P =
1
3 ∙ βP|σ2θ=0 > 0. (90)
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To see this, note that β†P = βP|σ2θ=0 is independent of σ2T and A|σ2θ=0 > 0. As a consequence,
condition (87) is satisfied for σ2θ = σ2θ if σ2T is large enough. Due to continuity, this is true
within a neighborhood [σ2l , σ2h] ⊂ [σ2L, σ2H] of σ2θ . 
Proof of Proposition 7
Following the procedure used in the proof of Proposition 1, we establish the equilibrium
ERCs according to equation (15). Using these implicit characterizations, we use Car-
dano’s formula to find the explicit solution of βP:
βP =
3√A ∙
 3
√
1
2
+
√
1
4
+
1
27
∙ A + 3
√
1
2
−
√
1
4
+
1
27
∙ A
 (91)
with A = (σ
2
η+σ
2
θ+2∙ρ∙ση∙σθ)3
σ2P∙(σ2η+σ2θ+2∙ρ∙ση∙σθ)2+(σ2θ+ρ∙ση∙σθ)2∙σ2T
. It is easy to see that βP is strictly increasing in
A. Moreover,
dA
dρ ≤ 0 ⇔ ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ] (92)
with ρ = α ∙ ση
σθ
− (1 + α) ∙ σθ
ση
, ρ = α ∙ ση
σθ
− (1 + α) ∙ σθ
ση
,
α =
σ2T−4∙σ2P−
√
(σ2T−12∙σ2P)∙σ2T
2∙(4∙σ2P+σ2T )
, α =
σ2T−4∙σ2P+
√
(σ2T−12∙σ2P)∙σ2T
2∙(4∙σ2P+σ2T )
.
A prerequisite for the existence of the interval [ρ, ρ] is that σ2T > 12 ∙ σ2P. For σ2θ < σ2η,
we have dρ/dα, dρ/dα > 0 and
dα
dσ2T
= −
(σ2T − 12 ∙ σ2P) + 4 ∙ (σ2T −
√
(σ2T − 12 ∙ σ2P) ∙ σ2T )
(4 ∙ σ2P + σ2T )2 ∙
√
(σ2T − 12 ∙ σ2P) ∙ σ2T
∙ σ2P < 0, (93)
dα
dσ2T
=
1
2
∙
8 + 10∙σ
2
T−24∙σ2P√
(σ2T−12∙σ2P)∙σ2T
(4 ∙ σ2P + σ2T )2
∙ σ2P > 0. (94)
As a consequence, ρ is decreasing and ρ is increasing in σ2T . Moreover:
lim
σ2T→∞
ρ = −σθ
ση
< 0, lim
σ2T→∞
ρ =
σ2η − 2 ∙ σ2θ
ση ∙ σθ , limσ2T→12∙σ2P
ρ = lim
σ2T→12∙σ2P
ρ =
σ2η − 5 ∙ σ2θ
4 ∙ ση ∙ σθ . (95)
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For 5 ∙σ2θ < σ2η < 25 ∙σ2θ , we have limσ2T→∞ ρ > 1 and 0 < limσ2T→12∙σ2P ρ = limσ2T→12∙σ2P ρ <
1, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 6
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Corollary 6
Rearranging equation (18) for the equilibrium ERC β0 yields:
F0 ≡
∑
a∈A
γ(a0)2 ∙ σ2a
 ∙ β30 + σ2v ∙ (β0 − 1) = 0 (96)
Note that F0 is increasing in β0. Its slope depends on the sum
∑
s∈A γ(s0)2 ∙ σ2s . Raising the
number of reporting users from n+1 to n+2 increases this sum by γ(n+1,0)2 ∙σ2
n+1. Similarly,∑
s∈A γ(s0)2 ∙σ2s takes higher values if a reporting user a ∈ A/{0} changes his objective such
that the new objective is associated with higher (relative) uncertainty, γ(a0) = Var[v˜a]/σ2v .
In both cases, equation (96) is satisfied by a lower level of β0. 
Proof of Proposition 8
We use the implicit function theorem to show comparative static results of β0 with regard
to σ2M, M ∈ P(A). Using the implicit characterization of β0 according to (96), we can
conclude that
dβ0
dσ2M
= −∂F0/∂σ
2
M
∂F0/∂β0
=
∑
a∈A/M
3 ∙ γ(a0)2 ∙ σ2a +
∑
a∈M
(3 ∙ γ(a0) − 2) ∙ γ(a0) ∙ σ2a(∑
a∈A
γ(a0)2 ∙ σ2a
)
∙ σ2v
∙ (1 − β0) ∙ β03 − 2 ∙ β0 .(97)
Because β0 < 1, we can conclude that
sgn
(
dβ0/dσ2M
)
= sgn
 ∑
a∈A/M
3 ∙ γ(a0)2 ∙ σ2a +
∑
a∈M
(3 ∙ γ(a0) − 2) ∙ γ(a0) ∙ σ2a
 . (98)
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This sign can only be negative if γ(a0) < 2/3 for at least one a ∈ M, i.e., AM , ∅. Then,
the expression on the right-hand side becomes negative if and only if∑
a∈AM
−(3 ∙ γ(a0) − 2) ∙ γ(a0) ∙ σ2a >
∑
a∈A/M
3 ∙ γ(a0)2 ∙ σ2a +
∑
a∈M/AM
(3 ∙ γ(a0) − 2) ∙ γ(a0) ∙ σ2a. (99)

51
